International Painters and Allied Trades Industry Pension Fund V. Florida Glass of Tampa Bay, INC. et. al.
- Case Type:
- Business
- Case Status:
- Affirmed
- Citation:
- 25-1312 (4th Circuit, Jan 26,2026) Published
- Tag(s):
-
- Ruling:
- The Fourth Circuit held that a multiemployer pension plan's filing of a "contingent" proof of claim for withdrawal liability in a contributing employer's bankruptcy did not constitute a "notice and demand" under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA), and therefore did not trigger the six-year statute of limitations for collection of withdrawal liability from nonbankrupt members of the employer's control group.
- Procedural context:
- Florida Glass of Tampa Bay, a building and construction industry employer, ceased contributing to the International Painters and Allied Trades Industry Pension Fund in 2015 and filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2016, which was later converted to Chapter 7. At the time of the bankruptcy filing, the pension plan had not yet determined whether Florida Glass had withdrawn from the plan.
So the pension plan filed a “contingent” $1.6 million proof of claim. The claim was allowed when no one objected, and the plan received a $48,349 distribution from the bankruptcy estate. In 2022, the plan finally determined that Florida Glass and its control group had withdrawn and issued a formal notice and demand. The plan then sued the control group members in 2023 to collect the withdrawal liability.
The defendants moved for summary judgment on the statute of limitations. They argued that the 2016 proof of claim constituted both a "notice and demand" under 29 U.S.C. § 1399(b)(1) and an "acceleration" under 29 U.S.C. § 1399(c)(5), meaning the six-year limitations period began running in November 2016 and expired before the 2023 lawsuit was filed. The district court denied the motion, holding that the limitations period did not begin until the pension plan determined that Florida Glass has withdrawn from the plan and not when the contingent proof of claim was filed. The defendants appealed, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
- Facts:
- Writing for the majority, Judge Wilkinson rejected the defendants' argument that every proof of claim automatically operates as a notice and demand as a matter of law. He acknowledged that, while a proof of claim may serve dual purposes when it clearly satisfies the MPPAA's requirements, that rule should not apply where the filing is ambiguous.
The court emphasized that the MPPAA's structure, including its "as soon as practicable" language, reflects Congress's deliberate choice to afford pension plans flexibility in when and how they assess withdrawal liability. Judge Wilkinson noted that the law intentionally "place[s] the running of the statute of limitations in the control of the fund," and that treating every contingent proof of claim as a notice and demand would "turn this concept on its head by handing the stopwatch to the bankrupt employer."
The Fourth Circuit articulated a new standard: a proof of claim operates as a notice and demand "only when it clearly satisfies the MPPAA's requirements." Specifically, it must clearly notify the employer of withdrawal liability, demand payment, and be submitted as soon as practicable after the employer's withdrawal. Ambiguity should be resolved by concluding that the proof of claim is not a notice and demand.
Comparing the 2016 proof of claim to the 2022 formal notice and demand, Judge Wilkinson found the former fell far short of clarity. The 2016 filing did not use the word "demand," did not mention the MPPAA's dispute resolution procedures, listed two different amounts without explanation, and-most critically-labeled the claim "contingent." Because a demand for withdrawal liability levied after an employer's certain withdrawal would not be contingent, the court concluded that this label "suggested by definition" that the plan had not yet determined whether the defendants had withdrawn.
While acknowledging that this "panoply of ambiguities" did not require any "magic set of words," Judge Wilkinson ruled it was "impossible" to conclude that the proof of claim clearly demanded payment of withdrawal liability.
The defendants alternatively argued that the plan's acceptance of a $48,349 distribution from the estate transformed the filing into a notice and demand. The court rejected this argument, too, noting that parties in interest had the opportunity to object to the claim, and their failure to do so "cannot after the fact transform the filing into a clear notice and demand." The district court appropriately addressed this issue by subtracting the distribution from the final award.
Because the court determined the proof of claim was not a notice and demand, it necessarily followed that it was not an acceleration either. Under the MPPAA, acceleration requires an "outstanding amount" of withdrawal liability, which does not exist until a notice and demand has been issued.
This decision has significant implications for multiemployer pension plan fiduciary practice. Plans operating in the building and construction industry face unique challenges: a contributing employer's bankruptcy may occur before the plan can determine whether withdrawal has actually occurred, given the industry-specific five-year lookback rules in 29 U.S.C. § 1383(b)(2). The Fourth Circuit's ruling confirms that plans can file protective contingent proofs of claim to preserve their rights without inadvertently triggering the statute of limitations.
The decision also underscores the importance of clear drafting when pension plans do intend to issue a formal notice and demand through bankruptcy filings. Plans seeking to start the dispute resolution clock should use explicit language demanding payment and referencing the MPPAA's procedures.
- Judge(s):
- Wilkinson, Wynn, and Keenan
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