Hidy v. Bullard (In re Bullard)
- Summarized by Adam Ballinger , Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP
- 13 years 7 months ago
- Citation:
- 11-6009 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. June 14, 2011)
- Tag(s):
-
- Ruling:
- Collateral estoppel does not apply to the Debtor's plea of guilty to the crime of battery in the second degree. The issues in the dischargeability action are not essential to the judgment in the criminal action. Second degree battery, under Arkansas law, may be found on either purposeful or reckless conduct. The criminal action could have been decided on either type of conduct and mere recklessness would not support an action under 523(a)(6). Collateral estoppel also does not apply to the Debtor's stipulation to liability in the civil action for the intentional tort of battery. The Creditor argued that the Debtor's liability was decided during the "summary judgment phase" of the civil action and that the Debtor either admitted liability or did not contest liability before the state court that granted summary judgment on the issue of liability. The Debtor failed to prove by sufficient evidence to the bankruptcy court that liability was admitted or uncontested - even if there were a legal distinction drawn between a stipulation to liability or whether it was admitted or uncontested in response to a summary judgment motion. Finally, based upon the evidence before the bankruptcy court and the uncertainty regarding whether the Debtor threw the glass directly at the Creditor, or instead at the table, the bankruptcy court relied on circumstantial evidence regarding the Debtor's state of mind. Relying on the judgment and the lack of a punitive damages award by the jury the bankruptcy court found no maliciousness had not been met. The bankruptcy court made no clear error as to this fact.
- Procedural context:
- Appeal from the judgment of the bankruptcy court holding that a debt was not excepted from discharge under 523(a)(6)
- Facts:
- Jonathan Hidy ("Creditor") and Marty Bullard ("Debtor"), along with coworkers and friends were having dinner and consuming drinks at two separate restaurants. During the evening, an argument erupted between a third party and the Debtor. The Creditor intervened by asking the Debtor to "watch himself". Conflicting testimony to the bankruptcy court by both the Creditor and the Debtor explained that either the Debtor threw a glass directly at the Creditor, or the Debtor, out of frustration, threw a glass at the table - breaking it. Under either scenario, the glass (or pieces of it) struck the Creditor in the face eventually resulting the in the total loss of vision in his right eye. The Debtor pleaded guilty to the criminal charge of battery in the second degree because he felt he would not receive a fair trial and wished to avoid the uncertainty and expense of trial. The Creditor also filed a civil action for the tort of intentional battery against the Debtor. The Debtor stipulated to liability and a jury trial was held only on the issue of damages. The jury awarded compensatory damages but did not award punitive damages. The Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Shortly thereafter, the Creditor initiated an adversary proceeding against the Debtor seeking both a determination of nondischargeability under 523(a)(6) and a denial of discharge under 727. The Creditor argued that the bankruptcy court should be precluded from determining "willful" and "malicious" elements of 523(a)(6) under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Second, the Creditor argued that the bankruptcy court made a factual error by determining that while the Debtor's action was willful, it was not malicious. The bankruptcy court discharged the debt owed to the Creditor (the compensatory damages awarded by the jury in the civil action).
- Judge(s):
- Schermer, Federman, and Venters
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